Paradoxes of India’s Westernophobia

Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
Published

May 3, 2026

Foreign Policy, Defence & Geopolitics India-US strategic-autonomy

India has to leverage this situation and change the US-EU-China triangle into a rectangle.

Origin

This framework was developed by Pranay Kotasthane for the India Policy Watch section of Anticipating the Unintended, during the Russia-Ukraine war, when India’s geopolitical stance came under Western scrutiny. It builds on an earlier tri-axis model of bilateral relationships.

What it says

The analysis begins with K. Subrahmanyam’s enduring principle: in a three-person game where America is Number One, China is Number Two, and India is lower down, it is in India’s best interest to ensure that America remains Number One. With intense US-China contestation, convergence between the West and India is at an all-time high.

And yet, a streak of Westernophobia — particularly anti-Americanism — persists. The framework maps this through three paradoxes:

Paradox 1: Vishwaguru and Victim. Many Indians believe India’s concurrence is indispensable for any future global order. Yet the same people hold that India is a victim of circumstances — too weak to call out Russia, too vulnerable to ally with the US. Only one of these can be true. Either India has leverage and should use it, or it needs to gain power quickly through collaboration with richer partners.

Paradox 2: Three is Better than Two. Many believe a closer India-Russia partnership can wean Russia away from China. This is fantastical: India’s GDP per capita is a fifth of Russia’s and China’s, and the Russia-India partnership is a single-track defence trade relationship. With RIC, the successor to Western unipolarity will not be multipolarity but a Sinocentric order.

Paradox 3: Silent Majority vs Vocal Minority. A Takshashila Global Outlook Survey found that 64 per cent of non-expert respondents rated India-US as the most important bilateral relationship — far ahead of Russia at 10 per cent. The Westernophobia of India Twitter is not representative.

Applied

The framework suggests that India’s foreign policy establishment has largely managed the state-to-state relationship well (Quad 2.0, defence agreements). The people-to-people relationship is strong. The problem is the state-to-people axis: many Indians still harbour deep frustration with the American state, drawing lessons from 1971 and Afghanistan that are outdated.

Resolving these paradoxes is a key policy challenge. The US can help by backing India’s UNSC inclusion, reducing technology transfer barriers, and deepening the technology alliance.

When it falls short

The framework treats Westernophobia as primarily an Indian problem. It understates legitimate American inconsistencies — on Pakistan, on immigration, on technology access — that fuel Indian scepticism. It also does not address the domestic political incentives for some Indian leaders to stoke anti-Western sentiment.