Three Schools of Thought on India–US Relations
India’s options toward the United States and China must always be greater than their options toward each other.
Origin
This framework was developed by Pranay Kotasthane in the Matsyanyaaya section of Anticipating the Unintended, classifying Indian perspectives on the India-US relationship into three coherent schools.
What it says
School 1: Retaliatory. The underlying principle: why should India support the US when it continues to support Pakistan’s military-jihadi complex? Why shouldn’t India impose tariffs on US goods when the US does the same to India?
As Bharat Karnad puts it: “Modi seems smitten by America, and losing the plot on how to further the national interest.”
The framework judges this school as low on realism. It ignores the opportunity costs of not having the US on India’s side, and the opportunity benefits of alignment.
School 2: Bandwagoning. The perspective, most effectively conveyed by K. Subrahmanyam: align with the US to increase India’s own power. The US and India have no clash of national interest; the two-million-strong Indian diaspora is a natural bridge.
The risk: allying with the US can decrease India’s power if it is put on a collision course with China, or pushed into conflicts of little interest.
School 3: Swing power / Marginal cost-benefit strategy. India should do business with both the US and China so that both take it seriously. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta warns: “An open declaration of a political and defence alignment with the US forecloses those options.”
Nitin Pai agrees: “Despite an alignment of interests, [India] must not always side with the United States. It must swing.”
The cost: with neither the US nor China backing India completely, their conduct with Pakistan becomes a determinant for India’s success as an international player.
Applied
The framework makes clear that regardless of which school one favours, the highest common factor is a substantial and rapid rise in India’s power — economic, military, maritime, and political. Unless that happens, India’s options with any major power will always remain less than their options with each other.
The framework also suggests that India’s current policy — closer to the swing-power school — is constrained by insufficient power. As India grows, it may be able to move closer to a bandwagoning posture without the risks that currently attend it.
When it falls short
The framework is a snapshot of Indian strategic debate as of the late 2010s. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the Ukraine war have shifted the calculus. The “swing” option may be closing as both superpowers demand clearer alignment. The framework also does not engage with the domestic political economy of each school.
Further reading
- Karnad, Bharat. Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet). Oxford University Press, 2015.
Originally explored in Matsyanyaaya: On the India–US Relationship on Anticipating the Unintended.